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Adam Schenk*  Insulated from Justice? Religious Expulsion
 Before Canadian Courts in the post-Highwood
 Era
Judicial consideration of religious disputes prompt concerns that the legal system 
may delve into issues of a spiritual nature that should enjoy some insulation 
from legal comment or intervention. These concerns are only heightened in 
instances where the dispute concerns the very serious issue of the expulsion 
of a member from their religious community. While necessary care is warranted 
in these sensitive circumstances, a blanket prohibition on legal intervention in 
instances of religious expulsion creates the possibility that a member of a religious 
community may experience the devastation of expulsion in an unfair and unjust 
manner. This paper, written prior to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v Aga but 
anticipating its outcome, argues that Canadian law lacks a proper framework to 
facilitate appropriate legal consideration of these sensitive disputes where such 
consideration is necessary.
L’examen judiciaire des litiges religieux suscite des inquiétudes quant à la possibilité 
que le système juridique s’immisce dans des questions de nature spirituelle qui 
devraient être protégées de tout commentaire ou intervention juridique. Ces 
inquiétudes sont encore plus vives dans les cas où le litige porte sur la question 
très grave de l’expulsion d’un membre de sa communauté religieuse. Bien qu’une 
attention nécessaire soit justifiée dans ces circonstances délicates, interdire de 
manière générale l’intervention juridique dans les cas d’expulsion religieuse crée 
la possibilité qu’un membre d’une communauté religieuse fasse la douloureuse 
expérience de l’expulsion d’une manière injuste et inéquitable. Dans le présent 
article, rédigé avant la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’affaire 
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral c. Aga, mais 
anticipant son résultat, nous soutenons que le droit canadien ne dispose pas 
d’un cadre adéquat pour faciliter l’examen juridique approprié de ces différends 
sensibles lorsqu’un tel examen est nécessaire.
* External Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, Lakehead University. I would like 
to thank all those who provided feedback on this article, and in particular Mark Doble, Chris Arnone 
and Neil McCartney for providing their legal perspectives. A very special thank you to my mom and 
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Introduction
Given Canada’s cultural and religious diversity it is unsurprising that 
some Canadians choose to resolve disputes in accordance with religious 
principles rather than via secular forums of dispute resolution or 
adjudication. A variety of religious communities utilize quasi-judicial, 
internal processes to resolve community disputes, such as whether to 
expel a member from the community, in accordance with religious dogma. 
A party to one of these disputes, unhappy with the ultimate decision of the 
community’s adjudicators, will occasionally initiate a legal claim hoping 
to receive a different result from a Canadian court. The ensuing cases are 
often challenging. Judges that are tasked with determining whether legal 
intervention in the internal decision of a religious community is appropriate 
must consider difficult questions regarding the limits of judicial oversight 
in a society where church and state have been clearly separated. 
While Canadian courts are loath to interfere in internal religious 
affairs and will generally avoid intervention in religious disputes where 
possible, some cases will require the piercing of this veil to address severe 
injustices.1 While the framework of administrative law provided practical 
tools for courts addressing these cases, the application of the principles of 
judicial review were deemed inappropriate in the legal consideration of 
the decisions of religious adjudicators in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
2018 decision in Highwood	Congregation	of	Jehovah’s	Witnesses	(Judicial	
1. Justice Muldoon concisely explains this unique context in Reed	v	R, [1989] 3 FC 259, 1989 
CarswellNat 291 (WL Can) (Ont Div Crt), noting at para 8 that while “in any collision between 
religious practice and secular law, the secular state will jealously enforce its criminal law and other 
public law despite religious claims or objections…[however] so long as those [religious] passions 
do not cause, create or commit criminal offences or civil delicts, which are entirely within the state’s 
power of legislation, the secular state will not, and ought not to intervene in religious affairs.” 
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Committee)	 v	Wall.2 While the decision in Highwood	was undoubtedly 
legally correct on this point, subsequent case law in this area, most 
notably the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 2020 decision in Aga	v	Ethiopian	
Orthodox	 Tewahedo	 Church	 of	 Canada,3 suggests that Canadian law 
still lacks an appropriate framework for the legal consideration of the 
decisions of religious adjudicators. As will be demonstrated, addressing 
these disputes through the lens of ordinary contract law is unhelpful and 
largely undesirable from the perspectives of the courts as well as religious 
communities and individual claimants. The current status of the law 
creates the potential for mistreatment of individual members of religious 
communities in the form of unfair expulsion without the possibility of any 
legal remedy. The ultimate solution to this issue may be specific guidance 
in this area from legislatures to better guide and equip judges tasked with 
hearing these difficult cases. 
I. The status of the law pre-Highwood
The judicial approach to considering decisions of internal adjudicators 
of religious communities was heavily reliant on the framework of 
administrative law, in particular its principles ensuring procedural fairness 
is afforded to the affected individual,4 prior to the decision in Highwood.	
This provided a practical, fair and familiar way for courts to address internal 
adjudicative decisions of religious groups. Simply grabbing your judicial 
review glasses off the shelf to assess the case and determining whether 
intervention was necessary, in the same manner as you would consider 
the decision of an administrative tribunal, was an elegantly simple option 
for Canadian judges. Applying the principles of procedural fairness meant 
that religious members would be afforded the necessary rights to respond 
2. 2018 SCC 26 [Highwood]. 
3. 2020 ONCA 10 [Aga]. This article was completed in its entirety prior to the Supreme Court’s 
eventual decision in this case, Ethiopian	Orthodox	Tewahedo	Church	of	Canada	St.	Mary	Cathedral	
v	Aga, 2021 SCC 22. 
4. A complete review of the concept of procedural fairness is far outside the scope of this paper, 
but the principles underlying procedural fairness as noted in para 22 in Baker	v	Canada	(Minister	of	
Citizenship	and	Immigration), [1999] SCR 817, 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) capture its basic essence:
Although the duty of fairness is flexible and variable, and depends on an appreciation 
of the context of the particular statute and the rights affected, it is helpful to review the 
criteria that should be used in determining what procedural rights the duty of fairness 
requires in a given set of circumstances. I emphasize that underlying all these factors 
[considered in determining the appropriate procedural rights] is the notion that the purpose 
of the participatory rights contained within the duty of procedural fairness is to ensure 
that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the 
decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity 
for those affected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have 
them considered by the decision-maker.
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to whatever allegations had been made against them by their community, 
thereby ensuring some basic element of justice in these internal processes. 
In her summation of some of the early case law surrounding the discipline 
of church laypeople generally and religious expulsion particularly, 
Professor MH Ogilvie identifies some of the valuable principles that 
ensured fairness for individuals subjected to religious tribunals:
The principles of natural justice are required to be followed in all matters 
of lay discipline, whether or not the constitution or customary practices 
of the religious institution so provide; thus, lay members under discipline 
must be told the full case against them, receive the right to reply, and be 
heard by an unbiased tribunal.
When a decision is made to expel a member, it must be carried out 
in accordance with the proper procedures of that institution and the 
civil court will intervene to order that such procedures be followed. 
Membership rights in a religious institution can be removed only for 
cause, and where they have been improperly withdrawn, a civil court 
will intervene in the internal life of the institution to restore them or to 
order a proper hearing of the issues.5 
In order to find that the very practical framework of administrative 
law and its principles of procedural fairness were legally applicable to 
religious disputes, however, it was necessary to explain how the courts 
had jurisdiction to apply these administrative law principles in this 
unique context. Administrative law is a branch of public law, whereas 
religious expulsion is a very private matter,6 and this lack of congruity 
meant that some very stretched legal reasoning was necessary to bring 
religious disputes under the umbrella of administrative law. Two of the 
methods utilized to come under this umbrella are demonstrated in the 
decision in Lindenburger	v	United	Church	of	Canada.7	Lindenburger	dealt 
with the circumstances surrounding the breakdown of the relationship 
between Reverend Lindenburger and the United Church congregation 
which he pastored.8 The motion of the United Church to have Reverend 
5. M H Ogilvie, Religious	Institutions	and	the	Law	in	Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017) 
at 328 [citations omitted].
6. The limited application of administrative law was succinctly described in Karahalios	 v	
Conservative	Party	of	Canada,	2020 ONSC 3145 at para 177 [Karahalios]; Justice Perell notes that 
“judicial review, however, is for the review of the exercise of public power and, therefore, judicial 
review is not available outside of the public sector sphere” [citations omitted].
7. [1985] OJ No 1195 (QL), 10 OAC 191, (Ont Div Crt) [Lindenburger]. This decision was upheld 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Lindenburger	v	United	Church	of	Canada, 1987 CarswellOnt 899 
(WL Can), 20 OAC 381. 
8. Lindenburger,	supra note 7 at para 17. The dismissal of employees of religious communities, 
particularly from positions that are spiritual in nature, lies outside the scope of this paper but has also 
presented unique questions and challenges with which Canadian courts have grappled. 
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Lindenburger’s request for judicial review quashed on the grounds that 
the courts lacked jurisdiction was dismissed by the  Divisional Court.9 
Justice Rosenberg explained multiple routes via which jurisdiction could 
be found and the principles of administrative law therefore applicable:
The right to intervene in church affairs should be rarely exercised by 
the Court. However, since the church is a creature of statute of both the 
federal and provincial Legislatures and it is common knowledge that 
it ministers to the spiritual needs of a large segment of the Canadian 
public, it has a sufficient public character that it should be amenable 
to the process of certiorari. At a minimum it has a duty of procedural 
fairness in dealing with its members. Accordingly, there might be some 
circumstances where the Court would intervene. For these reasons, the 
motion to quash fails.10
While the statutory nature of the United Church of Canada is unique, and 
would not provide an avenue for a finding of jurisdictional authority for 
many religious communities, the argument that religious communities are 
sufficiently public in character and therefore attract a duty of procedural 
fairness pursuant to the principles of administrative law has far broader 
possible application. The court in Lindenburger	does not go into particular 
detail regarding the test to be met regarding public character, with Justice 
Rosenberg in the above passage suggesting that the test is simply serving a 
“large segment” of the Canadian public. This test is as minimal in its detail 
as it is broad in its potential application and Lindenburger	is unsurprisingly 
relied upon in a number of subsequent decisions as authority for the 
application of the principles of judicial review in the scrutinizing of church 
decisions.11 
II. The impact of Highwood
The major issue with the pre-Highwood	framework was that a very practical 
house had been built on a very weak legal foundation. There was obvious 
utility in adopting the principles of administrative law in considering 
the decisions of religious adjudicators, but the legal justification for 
adopting these principles in this context was questionable at best. While 
the application of the principles of procedural fairness in private disputes 
may be desirable, and perhaps ultimately just, it is typically the place of 
the parties involved in a private disagreement to determine that certain 
9. Justice Barr dissented in the ultimate decision in the case but did not disagree with the majority 
of the Divisional Court on the issue of jurisdiction to impose the principles of procedural fairness (see 
ibid at para 80). 
10. Lindenburger,	supra note 7 at para 19.  
11. See for instance Davis	v	United	Church	of	Canada	(1991),	8 OR (3d) 75 at paras 46-49, 92 DLR 
(4th) 678; Mott-Trille	v	Steed	(1996), 27 OR (3d) 486 at para 12, [1996] OJ No 202 (QL).
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principles should govern their dispute unless the legislature has decided to 
impose these principles explicitly upon them via statute. While Canadian 
law does provide for some bleeding of legal principles from public law 
into private law, such as the permissible influence of the values of the 
Canadian	 Charter	 of	 Rights	 and	 Freedoms12 in the interpretation and 
application of private causes of action and their remedies,13 it does not 
simply follow that courts should impose principles of public law in the 
realm of private law without justification. 
It is on the problematic application of the principles of administrative 
law in a private context that the decision in Highwood	truly turns. Mr. Wall 
was expelled from the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses by 
the Congregation’s Judicial Committee after it determined that expulsion 
was warranted in light of Wall’s admittance of sinful behaviour and 
insufficient repentance of his wrongdoing. After exhausting the appeal 
opportunities available to him within the larger Jehovah’s Witnesses 
community, Wall applied for judicial review of the Judicial Committee’s 
decision.14 Both the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and the Alberta Court 
of Appeal15 found that the courts had jurisdiction to hear the application 
for judicial review. The Court of Appeal’s holding was very much in line 
with the reasoning developed in Lindenburger	and other decisions within 
this line of cases. The Supreme Court summarized the majority ruling of 
the Court of Appeal as follows:
The majority held that the courts may intervene in decisions of voluntary 
organizations concerning membership where property or civil rights are 
at issue. The majority also held that even where no property or civil 
rights are engaged, courts may intervene in the decision of voluntary 
associations where there is a breach of the rules of natural justice or where 
the complainant has exhausted internal dispute resolution processes.16
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Alberta Court of Appeal and took 
the opportunity to clearly state that judicial review is not available for 
decisions of private religious communities. Speaking for a unanimous 
court, Justice Rowe clarified that there is no freestanding right to procedural 
12. Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution	Act,	1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada	Act	1982	(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
13. The influence of Charter values on private causes of action based in the common law was 
confirmed and explained by the Supreme Court in Hill	v	Church	of	Scientology, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at 
paras 94-101, 1995 CanLII 59 (SCC).
14. Highwood,	supra note 2 at para 1. 
15. Wall	v	Highwood	Congregation	of	Jehovah’s	Witnesses	(Judicial	Committee), 2016 ABCA 255 
at para 29.
16. Highwood,	supra note 2 at para 9. See ibid at para 19 for a discussion of cases involving pre-
Highwood judicial review for voluntary associations such as political parties, sports clubs and schools.
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fairness in the decisions of private religious communities to expel a 
particular member and that “simply because a decision impacts a broad 
segment of the public does not mean that it is public in the administrative 
law sense of the term.”17 This firmly closed the door on the extremely broad 
public character test utilized in Lindenburger.	Justice Rowe’s reasoning 
was undoubtedly correct and clarified the nature of judicial review and the 
very particular contexts in which its principles apply. Administrative law 
resides firmly in the realm of public, not private, law. 
While the Supreme Court rejected Wall’s request for a remedy pursuant 
to judicial review, this did not close off the possibility of a remedy based 
on a private law cause of action. Courts will be appropriately wary of 
legal actions grounded in religious disputes but this does not mean that 
any dispute that is religious in nature will go unheard. In order for courts 
to consider these disputes, the claimants, like any other party initiating 
a private law claim, must be able to identify a legal right that has been 
violated by the religious community. If a claimant is unable to identify a 
discernible legal right, noted Justice Rowe, then the courts have no authority 
to comment on the procedures of a religious community in expelling one 
of its members.18 This is no more and no less than the rights afforded to 
every other Canadian; outside of the extraordinary recognition of a new 
type of private claim, a lack of a recognized cause of action means that the 
courts are unable to grant any type of remedy to an aggrieved party.
While the Court’s reasoning concerning the necessity of a discernible 
legal right is as accurate as the Court’s reasoning regarding the 
inapplicability of judicial review, the facts at issue in Highwood	present 
a context in which individual members of a religious community may 
be subject to significant injustices to which the Canadian justice system 
cannot, at least as the law exists presently, provide a remedy. Wall had 
been a member of the Highwood Congregation for thirty-four years before 
being disfellowshipped,19 a very significant commitment unlikely to be 
maintained by someone who does not place substantial personal value on 
their relationship with their faith community. Indeed, the circumstances 
that Wall had endured while still endeavouring to maintain his membership 
in his religious community, including a requirement prior to his own 
expulsion to shun his teenage daughter after she had been previously 
expelled from the Congregation, were accurately suggested by Patrick 
Hart in his analysis of the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in Highwood	
17. Ibid at para 21. 
18. Ibid at para 24. 
19. Ibid at para 6. 
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as possibly “strik[ing] some as heart-wrenching.”20 It is unlikely that Wall 
would have even attempted to endure such difficulties unless the personal 
importance of his affiliation with his religious community was deep and 
significant.
While Wall’s relationship with his community appeared to be 
significant in depth, the legal organization of the Highwood Congregation 
was tremendously shallow: 
The Congregation is a voluntary association. It is not incorporated and 
has no articles of association or by-laws. It has no statutory foundation. 
It does not own property. No member of the Congregation receives any 
salary or pecuniary benefit from membership. Congregational activities 
and spiritual guidance are provided on a volunteer basis by a group of 
elders.21 
Not dissimilar to many other religious communities across Canada, the 
Highwood Congregation had not chosen to incorporate, meaning that 
possible legal remedies available to members of not-for-profit corporations 
were not available to Wall. The net result of the informal nature of the 
Highwood Congregation, coupled with the Supreme Court’s elimination 
of resort to the principles of administrative law, was that Wall was left 
without any legal right on which he could rely. The Court was therefore 
unable to provide any type of remedy concerning Wall’s expulsion, 
regardless of whether or not they thought a remedy would be just.22 
III.	 The	misfit	between	religion	and	the	law	of	contract
The Supreme Court’s decision in Highwood	seemingly leaves members of 
a religious community that are unhappy with a decision of the community’s 
internal adjudicators with a single option, namely an argument that the 
decision breached the contract that existed between the individual and 
the community. For a number of reasons, however, the relationship 
between individual adherents and their religious communities will often 
be the proverbial square peg that does not neatly fit into the round hole of 
Canadian contract law. 
There are a number of very basic, well-established principles of 
contract law that will have application to any legal claim made on the basis 
of breach of contract. Some of these principles speak to the interpretation 
20. Patrick Hart, “Justice for (W)all: Judicial Review and Religion” (2017) 43:1 Queen’s LJ 1 at 6 
[citations omitted]. 
21. Highwood,	supra note 2 at para 3.
22. While not perfectly synonymous circumstances, one cannot help but recall the vexation resulting 
from the common law’s inability to provide just outcomes prior to the development of the law of 
equity. 
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of contracts, while others govern the prerequisites that must exist in order 
for a contract to have been created in the first place. As any first-year 
Canadian law student will readily explain, contracts require the basic 
foundation of offer, acceptance, and consideration. There is also the 
separate, but related, requirement that the parties must intend to create 
a legal relationship.23 In many contractual disputes, particularly those 
involving formal, written contracts between sophisticated parties, these 
basic elements are clearly met and do not require significant consideration 
(no pun intended) by the parties or their lawyers. In less formal contexts, 
however, these requirements may not have been so obviously met, thus 
creating a significant obstacle for a plaintiff. While there is a wide range of 
formalism in Canadian religious communities, it is not unusual for some 
communities, such as the Highwood Congregation, to utilize very legally 
informal structures and relationships with its members.24 As suggested by 
the Court in Highwood,	 this will create an uphill battle for members of 
religious communities to make what at present appears to be the only legal 
argument available to them, namely that their expulsion was improper 
insofar as it breached the contract that existed between the parties. If a 
member cannot establish the basic elements demanded by Canadian law, 
then there is no contract capable of being breached.  
The Court in Highwood considered (somewhat in the abstract) whether 
a contractual relationship existed between Wall and the Congregation. In 
their analysis, the Court noted the difficulties in establishing the intent 
to form a contractual relationship and suggested that courts would be 
reluctant to find that a contract has been formed in this particular context:
Mr. Wall argues that a contractual right (or something resembling a 
contractual right) exists between himself and the Congregation. There 
was no such finding by the chambers judge. No basis has been shown 
that Mr. Wall and the Congregation intended to create legal relations. 
Unlike many other organizations, such as professional associations, the 
Congregation does not have a written constitution, by-laws or rules that 
would entitle members to have those agreements enforced in accordance 
with their terms. In Zebroski	v.	Jehovah’s	Witnesses (1988), 87 A.R. 229 
(Alta. C.A.), at paras. 22-25, the Court of Appeal of Alberta ruled that 
membership in a similarly constituted congregation did not grant any 
23. John D McCamus, The	 Law	 of	 Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 112-113. 
Certainty of terms, or consensus ad idem, is also, of course, a fundamental element for the formation 
of a contract. 
24. Even in religious communities that have incorporated it does not necessarily follow that this will 
result in the legal formalizing of the relationships between members and their religious community. 
For instance, in Aga,	 supra note 3 at para 10 the plaintiffs were not members of the Cathedral’s 
corporation despite the Cathedral’s process for membership in the community. 
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contractual right in and of itself. The appeal can therefore be distinguished 
from Hofer	v.	Hofer, [1970] S.C.R. 958 (S.C.C.), at pp. 961 and 963, 
Senez	c.	Montreal	Real	Estate	Board, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.), at 
pp. 566 and 568, and Lakeside	Colony, at p. 174. In all of these cases, 
the Court concluded that the terms of these voluntary associations were 
contractually binding.
Moreover, mere membership in a religious organization, where no civil 
or property right is formally granted by virtue of membership, should 
remain outside the scope of the Lakeside	 Colony	 criteria. Otherwise, 
it would be devoid of its meaning and purpose. In fact, members of 
a congregation may not think of themselves as entering into a legally 
enforceable contract by merely adhering to a religious organization, 
since “[a] religious contract is based on norms that are often faith-based 
and deeply held”: R. Moon, “Bruker	 v.	 Marcovitz: Divorce and the 
Marriage of Law and Religion” (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 37, at p. 45. 
Where one party alleges that a contract exists, they would have to show 
that there was an intention to form contractual relations. While this may 
be more difficult to show in the religious context, the general principles 
of contract law would apply.25
It is very easy to envision circumstances in which an aggrieved member of a 
religious community may have significant difficulties proving the existence 
of a contract between themselves and their community. If a hypothetical 
church attendee never formalizes their membership within the community, 
either in writing, via religious ceremony or ritual, or otherwise, it will be 
difficult to demonstrate that any type of offer to form a contract was made 
and accepted. In a similar vein, not all religious communities demand a 
formal financial commitment from members, preferring instead to provide 
an opportunity for non-obligatory contributions. If this same hypothetical 
church attendee is not able to give financially to the church as a result of a 
fixed income and is unable to contribute to the community in other forms, 
such as helping with the upkeep of the church property or assisting in service 
preparations, there is seemingly a lack of consideration as the religious 
community is not receiving anything from this attendee that is likely to 
be recognized as consideration by a Canadian court.26 Yet this attendee 
25. Highwood,	supra note 2 at para 29. 
26. It is not suggested here that the membership and presence of physically, mentally, financially 
or otherwise limited persons is not meaningful for religious communities or that these individuals 
cannot provide anything to other members, only that their limitations may prevent them from 
making contributions that could be legally recognized as consideration. The legal hurdle to establish 
consideration in Canadian contract law is quite low, as even the provision of something of trivial value 
such as a peppercorn may suffice (see McCamus, The	Law	of	Contracts,	supra note 23 at 226). Despite 
this low hurdle, it is nevertheless difficult to envision a secular court ascribing even trivial value in the 
context of contract law to something as ethereal as, for instance, participation in collective religious 
worship or prayer.
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may place significant personal value on their relationship with the church, 
however that relationship may be described, and would be devastated to 
be expelled from the community for some alleged indiscretion without 
any element of procedural fairness. In these hypothetical circumstances, 
however, there appears to be no recourse to the courts, as there is clearly 
no freestanding right to procedural fairness post-Highwood	and there is no 
reasonable argument of breach of contract.
Even if this hypothetical church attendee were able to demonstrate 
offer, acceptance and consideration, there is still the significant obstacle 
of proving that there was an intention between the parties to enter into 
a contractual relationship. Of all the stumbling blocks, this is likely the 
most significant for two major reasons. First, the finding of an intention 
to create legal relations in the context of a religious community and 
its member is unlikely given the courts’ reluctance to find that a legal 
relationship has been established in social circumstances,27 a position that 
is reflected by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Highwood. It is especially 
unlikely the closer the context is to “mere” religious membership as 
opposed to circumstances of communal religious living where financial 
and commercial considerations are intertwined with spiritual affiliation.28 
Second, the courts are concerned with the very real implications of finding 
that a contract exists in the context of religious membership, namely the 
unenviable task of properly interpreting the contract, considering which 
terms of the contract are properly enforceable and which are not, and 
choosing the appropriate remedies if the contract’s terms are breached. 
These tasks would present significant and awkward challenges that would 
pull judges far deeper into the internal workings of a religious community 
than they would wish, making a finding that the parties had the intent to 
create a legal relationship in this context all the more unlikely. 
Canadian courts are now seemingly unable to address some significant 
injustices that may take place within religious communities as a result of 
the removal of the application of principles of judicial review to religious 
disputes and the inherent challenges in making a claim based on contract 
in the context of religious expulsions (and the challenges identified here 
27. McCamus, The	Law	of	Contracts,	supra note 23 at 136. 
28. Hutterite colonies in particular present challenging circumstances for the courts where spiritual 
affiliation and commercial activities may be intertwined and expulsion carries both spiritual and 
financial ramifications for expelled members. See for example Lakeside	Colony	of	Hutterian	Brethren	
v	 Hofer, [1992] 3 SCR 165, 1992 CanLII 37 (SCC). The intersection of business and religious 
engagement was also address in Highwood, supra note 2 at para 30, with the Court holding that 
Wall did not have any legal right to be allowed to carry on business with members of the religious 
community from which he had been expelled.
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are not being suggested as an exhaustive list). There should be concern 
whenever significant injustices occur that the legal system is entirely unable 
to address. While it is important for courts to not unnecessarily delve into 
the internal disputes of religious communities, it does not follow that all 
internal decisions, particularly decisions as serious as expulsion, should be 
free from any type of legal scrutiny. In several cases where interference in 
religious decision-making was considered by the courts, reference to the 
principles of procedural fairness was often accompanied by a reference 
to natural justice.29 These references to natural justice suggest that refusal 
to scrutinize the decision of a religious community simply by virtue of 
its religious nature runs contrary to a basic right to justice held by each 
member of a society. One wonders whether the unfortunate result of the 
Highwood	decision is that religious adherents have been distanced from 
access to justice within their own communities.
IV. The potential impact of Aga
While a claim based on breach of contract is a problematic option for 
those who feel they have been improperly expelled from their religious 
community, this single route may be even further limited depending on 
the ultimate outcome in	Aga	v	Ethiopian	Orthodox	Tewahedo	Church	of	
Canada.30 
The facts in Aga	are unique even within the uncommon category of 
cases dealing with religious expulsion. The plaintiffs are five members of 
the congregation of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada 
(also known as St. Mary’s Cathedral), all of whom had been a part of the 
congregation for more than twenty years. The plaintiffs all sat on a committee 
tasked with investigating an alleged heretical movement within the church 
community.31 The committee presented several recommendations to the 
administration of the diocese based on their findings.32 The archbishop 
chose not to implement the committee’s recommendations, much to the 
displeasure of the plaintiffs, who publicly voiced their objections.33 After 
warnings to stop their public attacks on the archbishop’s decision, the 
plaintiffs were informed, via both a personal letter from the archbishop 
and a letter from the Cathedral’s legal counsel, that they had been expelled 
from the Cathedral.34
29. This is noted in Hart	v	Roman	Catholic	Episcopal	Corp	of	the	Diocese	of	Kingston, 2011 ONCA 
728 at para 19.
30. Aga,	supra note 3.
31. Ibid at para 22. 
32. Ibid at para 24.
33. Ibid at paras 25-27. 
34. Ibid at paras 27-29. Given the Cathedral’s position that there was no unique legal relationship 
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The plaintiffs initiated legal action against the Cathedral. They alleged 
that the procedures regarding expulsion laid out in the constitution and by-
laws of the greater Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in the Diaspora 
(referred to hereafter as “the Church”) had not been followed.35 The 
Cathedral moved for summary judgment, successfully arguing that there 
was no contractual relationship between itself and the plaintiffs, resulting 
in a dismissal of the claim.36 The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed this 
decision unanimously. During the writing of this article, leave to appeal 
the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Aga	was granted by the 
Supreme Court and the case was heard on 9 December 2020.37 
The evidence presented on the motion for summary judgment 
seemingly satisfied a number of the criteria for the creation of a contract. 
The Court of Appeal appeared to identify that offer, acceptance, and 
consideration had been demonstrated:
In this case, the appellants were not simply adherents of the faith. They 
applied to be members of the Congregation and offered consideration in 
the form of monthly payments. They completed the required membership 
forms.38
Upon approval of their applications, the appellants became members of 
the Congregation. They entered into a mutual agreement to be part of the 
Congregation and abide by the governing rules, whether or not they were 
specifically aware of the terms.39
Short of becoming a member of a religious community’s not-for-profit 
corporation where one exists, this is likely as formal a membership 
process as one could expect to find for the admittance of new members 
to a religious community. If the Supreme Court ultimately reinstates the 
decision of the motions judge on this point, it is difficult to envision a 
factual scenario that would establish a contractual relationship regarding 
the membership of an individual within their religious community. 
While satisfying the criteria of offer, acceptance and consideration is 
helpful for the plaintiffs, this does not displace the burden of establishing 
between itself and its expelled members, it is interesting that the need was felt to send each of the 
members a letter from a lawyer. 
35. Ibid at para 3. 
36. Ibid at paras 5-6. 
37. Ethiopian	Orthodox	Tewahedo	Church	of	Canada	St	Mary	Cathedral,	et	al	v	Teshome	Aga,	et	
al, 2020 CanLII 40630 (SCC), 2020 CarswellOnt 8480 (WL Can). Reference to the Supreme Court’s 
judgment (again, rendered after the completion of this article) is at note 4. 
38. The lack of evidence regarding the proper completion of the forms and the contributions made 
by the plaintiffs was at issue before the Supreme Court. The analysis in this paper works from the 
assumption that they were properly completed. 
39. Aga,	supra note 3 at paras 46-47.
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that the parties intended to create a contractual relationship. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal did not consider this issue with any depth or specificity, 
instead relying on the existence of the Church’s by-laws and constitution 
as creating a contract between the parties:
Voluntary associations do not always have written constitutions and by-
laws. But when they do exist, they constitute a contract setting out the 
rights and obligations of members and the organization. In Ahenakew	v.	
MacKay	(2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 130 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 20 and 26, this 
court affirmed that voluntary associations are “a complex of contracts 
between each and every other member. The terms of these contracts are to 
be found in the constitution and by-laws of the voluntary association.”40
This analysis puts the cart before the horse. The existence of possible 
terms of a potential contract does not simply establish that the parties 
intended to form a contract, and on this point alone the Supreme Court 
could well substitute the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal with that 
of the motions judge that there was no contractual relationship between 
the parties.41 This would, of course, leave the plaintiffs without a cause of 
action and therefore without a remedy.
While the finding that a contract was formed between the parties would 
entitle the plaintiffs to some type of just remedy, likely in the form of an 
order directing the Cathedral to follow the expulsion process contemplated 
in the Church’s by-laws and constitution, the ultimate impact of this ruling 
as a precedent would be very problematic. It could invite extensive future 
breach of contract claims initiated by aggrieved adherents against their 
religious communities in a variety of contexts, forcing the courts into 
contractual analyses in awkward and challenging circumstances as well as 
inserting judges far more deeply into religious disputes than is desirable. 
Canadian courts, as clarified in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruker	v	
40. Ibid at para 40. This is sometimes referred to as the web of contracts theory. 
41. The web of contracts theory has also been relied upon in recent non-religious cases, notably 
in disputes between the Conservative Party of Canada and individuals pursuing candidacy for their 
various leadership positions: see Karahalios,	supra note 6 at paras 180-181 and Melek	v	Conservative	
Party	of	Canada, 2021 ONSC 1959 at paras 13-15. While a rejection of the web of contracts theory 
by the Supreme Court in their eventual decision in Aga would have ramifications for its use in non-
religious disputes as well, parties to these disputes may still be able to avail themselves of a contractual 
argument, with a proper contractual analysis centred on the intention of the parties and the particular 
context and circumstances in which the parties have engaged with each other. A court may find, for 
instance, that it was the intention of a political party and its prospective leadership applicant to create 
a contractual relationship, with the party’s written constitution and by-laws forming terms of that 
contract, and a contractual argument is therefore available without reliance on the web of contracts 
theory. Simply from a practical standpoint, one can see that a contract-based argument is far more 
appropriate in this more professional context as compared to a dispute between a religious adherent 
and their faith community.
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Marcovitz,	have the capacity to interpret and enforce contracts based on 
religious principles, but will be careful to only do so in the appropriate 
contexts and circumstances. 42 The contractual disputes that a finding of a 
contract in Aga	would invite as a precedent are far from desirable both for 
the courts and religious communities.
None of the conceivable outcomes in Aga	are likely to find a balance 
that ultimately meets the needs of religious communities or their individual 
adherents. The ultimate solution therefore may well lie outside of the 
hands of the courts.
V. A route forward 
A solution may be more readily provided by legislatures than by the 
courts. Ontario, for instance, has long resisted the formal acknowledgment 
of religious adjudication of any type, most notably in the decision not 
to acknowledge or address religious arbitration in Ontario’s Arbitration	
Act43 by the government of Dalton McGuinty in response to the desire 
within some segments of the Muslim community to establish arbitration 
centres based on sharia law.44 The net result of three factors—the lack 
of legislative input on religious dispute resolution, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Highwood	 that removed the application of judicial review 
principles and the lack of congruity between religious disputes and the law 
of contract—is a legal vacuum. Within this vacuum, religious members 
can be unfairly punished to the point of expulsion from the religious 
community by internal adjudicators without legal recourse. While an 
appropriate level of insulation between the legal and religious realms in 
Canada is certainly necessary, the tremendous personal toll that expulsion 
from a religious community can have on a community member suggests 
that where such expulsion has been determined in an inappropriate fashion, 
judicial intervention is merited. The constitutional protection of freedom 
of religion in the Charter	 should not mean that religious communities 
can decide on issues of expulsion without the guarantee of any process 
offering something resembling procedural fairness and be almost entirely 
insulated from any type of potential legal scrutiny. 
42. 2007 SCC 54. Speaking for the majority, Justice Abella highlights at para 47 that the context in 
question in that case was a formal separation agreement developed with the assistance of legal counsel, 
bringing the religious obligation in that agreement “appropriately under a judicial microscope.”
43. Arbitration	Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 17. 
44. Richard Moon, Freedom	of	Conscience	and	Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) at 159-160. 
Professor Moon notes that the failure to regulate religious arbitration has in all likelihood driven these 
processes to be even more secretive, making abuses that may be occurring that much harder to detect 
and address.
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The imposition of some basic principles of procedural fairness in the 
internal determination of religious disputes would undoubtedly attract 
a legal challenge on the basis that this imposition violates the religious 
freedoms protected under section 2(a) of the Charter,45 but there is 
certainly a reasonable argument to be made that such a breach would be 
justified under section 146 pursuant to the test from R	v	Oakes.47 Limited 
impositions of basic elements of procedural fairness would help further the 
important objective of protecting religious adherents from mistreatment 
while minimally infringing on the ability of religious communities to 
handle their own affairs. These procedural protections for individual 
adherents would support the protection of religious freedoms as an 
inherently personal right, a perspective that has been stressed in previous 
jurisprudence regarding section 2(a).48 While this potential imposition in the 
internal affairs of religious organizations would no doubt be opposed by a 
number of religious communities determined to safeguard their autonomy, 
limited legislation providing very basic procedural safeguards is far less 
of an imposition than the application of the ordinary law of contract if 
a contract were found to exist between members and their communities. 
Some religious communities may in fact discover that these legislative 
safeguards, rather than undermining the community’s autonomy, are in 
fact harmonious with existing procedures and religious perspectives on 
morality and fairness. 
Hypothetical legislation would have to be necessarily limited to the 
imposition of a right to procedural fairness only, not a right of substantive 
review of the expulsion decision itself, which would pull the judiciary too 
significantly into the religious realm.49 This would provide a reasonable 
compromise and stimulate transparency in the expulsion process while 
still honouring the rights of religious communities to make decisions 
based on their interpretation and application of their own religious dogma. 
This is not a perfect solution, as it would still allow for inappropriate 
45. Charter,	 supra note 12, s 2(a): “2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) 
freedom of conscience and religion.”
46. Ibid, s 1: “1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society.”
47. R	v	Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 1986 CanLII 46 (SCC). 
48. Most notably Syndicat	Northcrest	v	Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at paras 42-43. 
49. The need to limit the intervention of the courts in regards to substantive religious issues is well 
demonstrated in the decision in Syndicat	Northcrest	 v	Amselem,	 ibid.	While this case dealt with a 
personal religious practice rather than a decision of a religious community, the Supreme Court’s 
disapproval of the courtroom as a forum for the interpretation of religious dogma (Syndicat Northcrest 
devolved into a “battle of the experts” between rabbinical authorities) should wisely be applied in the 
latter context as well. 
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interpretations and applications of religious doctrine resulting in unfair 
expulsions, but it could at least ensure some basic due process for an 
impugned individual, and would ultimately be a vast improvement on the 
law as it currently exists. 
The importance of ensuring that some type of procedural fairness is 
afforded in internal decisions of religious expulsion is highlighted by the 
concurring reasons of Justice Henry in the Lindenburger	decision. Justice 
Henry concludes his reasons by underscoring the importance of fairness 
and transparency in the quasi-judicial decisions of religious communities:
I cannot leave this case without a final comment on the issue that has 
been raised by Mr. Lindenburger, that is the manner in which the case 
has been handled. I do not suggest that the church bodies concerned are 
required to conduct themselves in a manner similar to that required of a 
Court. I say only that in a circumstance such as that revealed in this case 
the simplest rule is, to ensure at the end of the day, whatever the final 
decision, that it can be said that the minister is told in clear terms the case 
he has to meet and be given a fair and full opportunity to meet it. The less 
complicated the proceedings the better and one would hope there would 
not be undue resort to legalistic thinking; there is no reason why men 
of goodwill cannot, on both sides, conduct themselves in a fair manner. 
That is all that the law and the spirit of Christianity requires of them.50
While Justice Henry’s argument in favour of the importance of procedural 
fairness is persuasive, it rests on a faulty assumption which highlights 
the importance of artificially ensuring procedural fairness in this context. 
Contrary to Justice Henry’s assertion, there are countless reasons why 
generally well-meaning individuals cannot, and do not, conduct themselves 
in a fair manner. This has necessitated the creation of law, the courts, and 
the appointment of judges such as Justice Henry to impose fairness where 
it has been improperly withheld. In the context of religious disputes, which 
often touch on issues that are extremely personal, it is not surprising that 
the maintenance of fairness may give way to emotional responses and 
decisions, which in some instances may result in the devastating expulsion 
of members of a religious community. In order to ensure a fair process, 
the courts need to be properly empowered with the authority to intervene. 
With clear legislative guidance, and judges remaining constantly mindful 
of the care that should be exercised when addressing religious disputes, 
the Canadian judicial system will be able to ensure that a fair process 
has been observed before an individual is expelled from their religious 
community.
50. Lindenburger,	supra note 7 at para 16.
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